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Abstract: Not all religious proselytizing is conducive to violence, yet some is,
and adopts specific words, images, sounds, and other signs in order to convey
its message. Defying frontiers among historical epochs, confessions, and dis-
ciplines, the essay develops a cross-cultural, trans-historical, and comparative
reading of violent religious propaganda, focusing on messages and media that
promote radicalization and the consequent mission to defeat the enemy disbe-
liever. In particular, the essay puts the current phenomenon of jihadist online
propaganda into historical and comparative perspective.
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1 Introduction
The word “propaganda” derives from the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide
(‘sacred congregation for the propagation of faith’), a congregation established by
Gregory XV’s bull Inscrutabili Divinæ on June 22, 1622 in order to promote the
diffusion of Catholicism and regulate Catholic ecclesiastical affairs in non-Catholic
countries (Leone 2010b: 334, n. 51). Propaganda is a central element of all human
groups that want to maintain and/or expand their domain, be it economic,
political, or cultural. Religious groups are not an exception.1 Proselytizing reli-
gions aim at the conversion of “non-believers”; non-proselytizing religions aim at
contrasting any agency that might convert their members to other creeds (Leone
2014a). In some cases, religious propaganda is so effective as to completely
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1 Bibliography on religious propaganda is extensive but fragmented. On religious propaganda
in ancient Rome, see Marco Simón et al. (2002); on late antique and medieval propaganda, see
Morenzoni (2013); on preaching and propaganda in the Middle Ages, see also Makdisi et al.
(1983); on religious propaganda in early-modern England, see Royer-Hemet (2014). A compre-
hensive, cross-confessional study of the phenomenon is missing.
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revolutionize the life of an individual (Leone 2004). After contact with religious
propaganda, the individual changes, converts, or radicalizes, and existential turn-
ing point brings about a new mission: defending one’s creed, combating the
disbeliever, perpetrating the most ferocious violence if necessary. Not all religious
proselytizing is conducive to violence, yet some is, and adopts specific words,
images, sounds, and other signs in order to convey its message (Leone 2007).
Religious propaganda, indeed, in all historical epochs, has never been disembo-
died, but always conveyed by specific media, messages, and texts, be it the
preacher’s coded gestures in a sixteenth-century Catholic mission in the
Mesoamerica (Leone 2011a) or the hashtagged Twits through which present-day
jihadists announce their terrorist deeds.
Defying frontiers among historical epochs, religious confessions, and dis-
ciplines, the present essay is meant to develop a cross-cultural, trans-historical,
and comparative reading of violent religious propaganda, focusing on texts,
messages, and media that promote radicalization and the consequent mission
to defeat the enemy disbeliever. In particular, the essay aims at putting the
current phenomenon of jihadist online propaganda into historical and compara-
tive perspective. The enflamed sermons of medieval Christian preachers inciting
believers to repent, convert, and embark on crusades (Cole 1991; Maier 1994,
2000); the gruesome early modern frescos instilling in novices the ardent desire
of destroying “the idols” of distant missions (Leone 2010b: 212); the web forums
where US anti-abortionists learned how to bomb abortion clinics (Leone 2008);
and the Facebook pages where present-day young European jihadists dream
about beheading “the infidels”: these texts, messages, and media are different
from several points of view, such as the religious imaginaire to which they
resort; the formats, genres, and media they adopt; the sociocultural and histor-
ical contexts in which they proliferate, etc. Yet, they also share a common goal:
converting, radicalizing, and turning to violent religion. Moreover, they feature a
common rhetoric dynamic: addressing the individual, they are able to use
words, images, and other signs in order to bestow on him/her a new identity,
and involve him/her in a grand narrative whose cornerstone is fight, violence,
and the annihilation of the confessional enemy.
An interdisciplinary approach composed of history and anthropology of
religion, cultural and media studies, religious and visual studies, security
studies and law, with cultural semiotics and rhetoric acting as interdisciplinary
sinews among them, is therefore proposed to develop a common protocol in
order to collect present-day jihadist propaganda materials, analyze them
through interdisciplinary methodology, and compare and contrast them with
texts, messages, and media of violent confessional persuasion in other historical
epochs, sociocultural contexts, and religious traditions. The ultimate goal of the
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essay is to detect the main lines of continuity and discontinuity in these
materials: is there a specificity of violent propaganda that resorts to religious
tradition in order to build its authority and persuasive power (Leone 2013). In
which way does it differ from violent propaganda issuing from secular discourse
(nationalism, political ideology, etc.)? What is the impact of the foundational
myths of each religious culture in shaping its violent propaganda? And how has
the evolution of communication technology, from verbal language to pictorial
perspective, from the Internet to social media, changed the dynamics of
religious radicalization?
The essay therefore focuses on jihadist violent propaganda, but seeks to
understand what is behind it even beyond the present geopolitical situation.
How can a message that appeals to sacred authority convince to fight, kill,
slaughter, and torture? What is it, in the rhetorical structure of words, images,
sounds, and other signs that captures the identity of believers and lead them to
radicalization, intolerance, and violence?
2 An anxious social demand of knowledge:
Jihadist propaganda today
The questions above bear on the comprehension of religious violence as a
trans-historical and cross-cultural phenomenon, but simultaneously point at
an extremely urgent issue of the present time. Late September 2014, EU
Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove declared that about three
thousand citizens with European passports are currently among the fighters of
the Islamic State (aka IS, ISIL, ISIS, or Daʿesh; hereafter, IS).2 One hundred and
thirty Canadian citizens joined the IS according to early 2014 estimates of the
Canadian Government.3 Late October 2014, US defense secretary Chuck Hagel
confirmed that over one hundred US passport holders are currently fighting
for ISIS.4 These figures are rapidly growing. North-American and European
governments are presently concerned about the terrorist activities that these
citizens are carrying on in Syria and in Iraq. Moreover, European governments
worry that these citizens might constitute a potential threat to the security of
2 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494 (accessed 26 June 2015).
3 http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/index-eng.aspx#a04
(accessed 26 June 2015).
4 http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/09/04/cbs-news-hagel-confirms-more-than-100-ameri-
cans-fighting-for-isis-in-iraq-syria/ (accessed 26 June 2015).
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European countries, since they might return to Europe after receiving military
and terrorist training in Syria and Iraq and participate in the organization of
terrorist attacks against civilians in European cities. Mehdi Nemmouche, the
suspected perpetrator of the May 24, 2014 shooting at the Jewish Museum of
Belgium in Brussels, Belgium, which killed four people, is believed to have
spent over a year in Syria and to have had contacts with Jihadists, recording a
video bearing the IS flag.5
Major intelligence and military efforts are currently being undertaken in
order to thwart the expansion of IS in the Near and Middle East, as well as to
trace the movements of people from Australia, Europe, and North-America to
Syria and Iraq and vice versa. In the urgency of countering this phenomenon,
though, a major issue is being neglected: how come that western citizens, in
most cases born and raised in western families, often with no Arab and/or
Muslim backgrounds, have suddenly converted to violent jihadism, left their
social context, traveled to Syria or Iraq, and become perpetrators of ferociously
violent acts against enemy fighters and civilians? What propaganda triggered
their conversion and/or radicalization? To what words, images, and other
messages were they exposed? And, most importantly, what communicative
patterns and persuasive strategies encouraged them to embark in such a tragic
existential path?
As research on this topic has disquietingly found, in most cases, personal
contact with other jihadists was marginal in igniting religious conversion and/or
radicalization. Most ISmembers holding western passports, indeed, did not convert
and/or radicalized in “real” places, such asmosques, Islamic centers, or prisons. On
the contrary, their existential turning point took place in “virtual” places, such as
jihadist websites, web forums, and, increasingly, social media like Facebook,
Twitter, Google Plus, and even Instagram and WhatsApp. The new channels of
violent jihadist persuasion have forced European intelligence services to dramati-
cally change their strategies: monitoring physical places like mosques, Islamic
centers, or prisons is becoming more and more irrelevant compared to the need
for monitoring web communication.
Yet, violent jihadist communicative patterns and persuasive strategies on
the web are much more difficult to survey, for both quantitative and qualitative
reasons. On the one hand, sources, centers, and knots of such communication
proliferate and evolve at incredible speed. On the other hand, most analysts lack
competence in order to effectively read these messages, decode their visual and
verbal rhetoric, decipher their narratives, and, therefore, understand why they
5 See http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/06/01/tuerie-de-bruxelles-un-suspect-francais-
arrete_4429835_3214.html (accessed 25 June 2015).
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so frequently conduce to dramatic existential turning points. The role of social
media in virtually recreating the orality and the aura of religious assemblies, for
instance, is generally being ignored, deserving urgent investigation.
3 Object and methodology of analysis
Military action against IS is currently the object of heated debate in many
European countries. Yet, whatever the ideological stand on this military initia-
tive might be, no definitive solution of the problem will be found without
in-depth questioning of its roots, that is, the astonishing willingness of many
young western citizens to join IS and commit the worst atrocities in its name.
Knowing who these people are, who talks to them, and with what goals are
extremely hard tasks. Yet, what can be objectively analyzed is what puts them in
contact and communication, that is, the myriads of jihadist words, images, and
other texts that circulate in the web. Analyzing these materials from a cross-
cultural, trans-historical, and interdisciplinary perspective is the only way to
understand and, possibly, defuse their persuasive potential.
The research protocol described by the essay therefore pursues the following
four objectives:
1. Singling out the main sources of jihadist propaganda on the web, with specific
attention to sources that explicitly address the young western audience;
2. Sampling these messages in order to detect recurrent communicative pat-
terns and persuasive strategies; previous research has shown that most of
these messages are conceived for an audience that is not fluent in Arabic
(such as potential converts among western citizens with second or third
generation migration backgrounds or with no Arab and/or Muslim back-
grounds; Bouzar and Caupenne 2014); indeed, some of these messages
contain Arab expressions, but are mostly in English and French, and to a
minor extent also in German, Italian, Spanish, and other European lan-
guages; moreover, previous research has also pointed out that the visual
dimension of these messages (including “special effects” and professional
or semi-professional editing) is much more relevant than their verbal con-
tent, often quite limited (Bouzar and Caupenne 2014). As a consequence,
semiotics must be adopted as the main methodology in order to dissect
these messages and understand their persuasive rationale; semiotics indeed
can be considered a contemporary version of ancient rhetoric; it studies
present-day communication but focuses on the aspects of it that escape
traditional linguistic analysis, such as images, sounds, editing, etc. At the
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same time, rhetoric and semiotic analysis must go hand in hand with a
strongly interdisciplinary procedure, aiming at placing each propaganda
item in its precise historical, sociocultural, and religious context, as well
as at understanding its technical features and implications in terms of
international security and law.
3. Elaborating a typology of persuasive narratives; there is no one way to
religious conversion and/or radicalization; each existential path to violent
jihad is different. Yet, when conversion and/or radicalization happen
“online,” they happen because jihadist propaganda has presented potential
fighters with a convincing narrative; with an existential scheme in which
young western citizens suddenly see a new role for themselves, a role that
they can play by embracing the jihadist cause (Leone 2014c). What are these
narratives? What roles they do propose (defender of armless Muslim civi-
lians in Syria against a despotic regime; adventurous traveler to an exotic
land; potential martyr; etc.)? How are these narrative roles embodied
visually, for instance in videos circulating in the web, and how are they
proposed for contagious imitation?
4. Comparing these communicative patterns and persuasive strategies with
those used by violent religious propaganda in other historical, sociocul-
tural, and confessional contexts. This is the riskiest task of the protocol,
since it challenges the short-period perspective of journalistic comment
and other “grey literature” with a wide-angled point of view: what do
these patterns and strategies share with those emerging from other
instances of violent confessional persuasion? Is there a cross-cultural
and trans-historical efficacy of violent images in fascinating viewers and
turning them into radical believers? Are there grand narratives, such as
that of mission and martyrdom, which appeal to converts across epochs
and faiths? And, on the opposite, what is the peculiar dynamic of radica-
lization that unfolds as a consequence of specific religious backgrounds
and communication technology, for instance, as a result of the virtual
bonds established by social media, or in response to the visual brilliancy
enabled by digital editing?
4 Beyond the state of the art
Literature on religious fundamentalism is extensive. Bibliography on its rhetoric
is scant. Comparative studies on its propaganda are sorely missing.
Since September 11, 2001, research and bibliography on Islamic religious
fundamentalism and violent jihadism has been burgeoning. In 2013 and 2014
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only, a multiplicity of essays has been published on several aspects of
this phenomenon.6 Works comparing Islamic fundamentalism with other
religious fundamentalisms are less frequent.7 Works on the rhetoric of jihadism
are rare.8
Despite increasing worldwide attention on jihad web propaganda, a
systematic survey of this phenomenon is missing, particularly as regards the
web conversion and/or radicalization and/or recruitment of young western
citizens by IS. Furthermore, scholarship in the field still requires fine-tuning of
a qualitative methodology able to detect and possibly counter the persuasive
strategies of such propaganda. The cross-cultural and trans-historical approach
proposed by the present essay is not to be found anywhere else.
One the one hand, religious terrorism is the antithesis of communication.
It does not aim at transmitting any message to its victims, but at annihilating
them. On the other hand, yet, religious terrorism is extremely powerful commu-
nication for those who witness the tragedy, directly or through media, and are
either terrified or fascinated by it (Bolt 2012). Terrorism acts revolutionize the
social attitudes of individuals and groups, pushing them to radically change
their lifestyles (Lynch and Argomaniz 2015). They instill fear, but can also attract
wicked admiration (Lewis 2012). From September 11 on, terrorist jihadist groups
have resorted to increasingly sophisticated communication in order to accom-
pany and guide the reception of their violent deeds (Mitchell 2011). Obeying a
global tendency, for jihadists too it was not sufficient to perpetrate violence and
instigate terror. It was equally fundamental to let the world know that violence
had been committed, and what was the appropriate cognitive, emotional, and
pragmatic interpretation of it (Tulloch and Blood 2012).
6 On Somalia, Hansen (2013); on Syria, Lefèvre (2013); on Afghanistan, Rubin (2013); on
Pakistan, Ullah (2013); on Chechnya and Eurasia, US Congress (2013); on West Africa,
Gow et al. (2013); on Indonesia, Rohmaniyah (2014); for a comparative survey on the
Middle East and the relation between ‘Arab Spring’ and jihadism, Rosefsky Wickham (2013)
and Telhami (2013); for a study on the link between radicalization in the Middle East and in
Europe, Joffé (2013); on Jihadism in Germany, Hafez (2013) and Schneiders (2014); in the UK,
Wali (2013); in Holland, Ross (2013); in Belgium and France, Viollet (2013); in Spain, Jordán
(2014); in Russia (Volga region), Markedonov (2013). Recent general surveys are Davidson
(2013) and Milton-Edwards (2013).
7 Moaddel and Karabenick (2013); on the French context, see Guitton (2013).
8 Besides the previous publications of the author of the present paper (Leone 2007, 2008,
2011c, 2012, 2014c), see also Ballod and Weber (2013); Hussain (2013) on the Pakistani context.
Even less numerous are updated studies that specifically focus on jihad web propaganda:
Lohlker (2013), Lombardi (2014); on the use of images, El Difraoui (2013) and Winkler and
Dauber (2014).
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However, whereas in the beginning terrorist jihadist groups would fabricate
messages to be transmitted by mainstream media (think at the role of Al Jazeera
in distributing Osama Bin Laden’s videos [Linder 2011]), from the second half of
the 2000s on, these groups more and more aimed at developing their own
media. The shift has been a consequence of the planetary diffusion of social
media. Through them, indeed, terrorist jihadist groups can not only reach large
audiences, but also learn how to become increasingly proficient at it. As several
analysts have already underlined, there is a technical abyss between the
amateurish videotapes that Osama Bin Laden would broadcast through Al
Jazeera and the sophisticated visual editing by which the so called Islamic
State flaunts its tragic accomplishments to the world (Winkler and
Dauber 2014). Moreover, whereas in the past a temporal gap would occur
between perpetration of a terror act and communication interpreting it for the
global audience, nowadays the gap has practically disappeared. As some com-
mentators have pointed out, while in the past war acts were accompanied by
rolling of drums, today terrorist jihadist violence is simultaneously ushered
by drones of Twits and YouTube videos (Adl 2012).
Timing and technique are not the only elements that marked the evolution
of terrorist jihadist communication in the last decade. The target of such
communication has also changed. Osama Bin Laden’s videos were primarily
addressed to an Arabic-speaking and Muslim audience. Most westerners could
access their content only through the linguistic and cultural mediation of
translators and interpreters. Moreover, these videos would mostly target wester-
ners as addressees of threats. Communication developed by the IS, especially
from the second half of 2014 on, has had a different communicative agenda:
it addresses westerners not only as targets of terrorist threats, but also as
potential affiliates. That is why IS communication increasingly resorts to
European languages, and mainly to English and French, but also to German
and Spanish, in order to communicate with its audience. In these messages, the
visual dimension is becoming more and more preponderant, yet it too seems to
adopt the codes and styles of western visual communication (for instance,
Hollywood narratives and visual effects [Gopnik 2014]). Made by western affili-
ates for other potential western affiliates, the current IS communication seems to
bridge more and more the gap between state war propaganda and terrorist
communication; social media, indeed, have enabled terrorists to directly reach
a global audience as effectively, and sometimes even more effectively, than
traditional state broadcasting propaganda.
The purposes of IS communication toward European citizens are manifold:
1) accompany, describe, and interpret terrorist acts in order to make their own
geopolitical narrative globally predominant against the geopolitical narrative
8 Massimo Leone
Brought to you by | Universita' Studi di Torino
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/24/15 9:05 AM
diffused by western governments and media; 2) instill terror in order to push to a
destabilization of western lifestyles and consequent sociopolitical tension;
3) gain ideological and financial support among old and new sympathizers;
4) recruit new members. This last goal represents the real novelty of IS terrorist
jihadist communication. With over three thousand IS fighters holding western
passports, the phenomenon is difficult to underestimate.
From the point of view of western countries, it involves three major security
risks: 1) the risk that especially young western citizens are indoctrinated by
IS propaganda and persuaded to join terrorist activities in the Middle East, and
specifically in Iraq and Syria. Fight casualties in these countries already include
hundreds of young western citizens; 2) the risk that some of these western
fighters return to their countries after being indoctrinated and militarily trained,
with the agenda and the ability to perpetrate major terrorist attacks against
civilians in western cities; 3) the risk that supporters of IS who are western
residents are given detailed knowledge about how to perpetrate major terrorist
attacks against civilians in western cities.
Given these risks, a major effort of intelligence is required. This effort must
aim at several goals. On the one hand, investigative goals; it will prove increas-
ingly fundamental to 1) know history, evolution, present state, and prospective
lines of development of jihadist terrorist media agencies; 2) analyze media
strategies these agencies adopt; 3) analyze texts produced and distributed
through these agencies; 4) study the circulation of these messages in the web;
5) gather evidence and formulate hypothesis about the cognitive, emotional, and
pragmatic impact of these media campaigns and messages on western audi-
ences; 6) investigate the potential and actual western targets of jihadist terrorist
propaganda, in order to understand whether they share a common social,
cultural, or psychological background.
On the other hand, investigative goals must lead to theoretical goals:
jihadist terrorist propaganda is not an isolated phenomenon in history, but
one that can be compared and contrasted with other instances of violent
confessional persuasion, emerging in other sociocultural contexts, historical
periods, and religious domains. Jihadist messages must therefore be put in a
cross-cultural, trans-historical, and interdisciplinary perspective, in order to
understand the transversal features of violent religious propaganda. Gaining
authority through reference to sacred texts (Leone 2012); representing “infidels”;
inciting believers to their forced conversion or to their annihilation; evoking
through words, images, and other signs the idea of an idolatrous enemy to be
violently subjugated; instilling the desire of embarking on dangerous religious
missions and invoking the sweetness of martyrdom; destroying the religious
artifacts of the Other: all these elements appear recurrently in history, often
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adopting expressive and emotional formulae that subtle lines link to past
representations, but that the evolution of media technology pushes toward
new levels of efficacy. Experimental and risky semiotic analysis must therefore
aim at developing an unconventional reading of contemporaneity through the
lenses of both cultural history and comparative theory: what types of texts are
commonly produced and circulated by violent religion? Where does their
efficacy lie? Which of their features are specific of a confessional, historical,
and sociocultural background, and which, on the contrary, travel from context
to context as a tragic representational patrimony of the humankind?
5 IS “western” propaganda
IS European propaganda is a new phenomenon that has attracted alarmed media
attention but still little scholarly research. One of the risky tasks semiotic analysis
must face is exactly that of sifting through “grey literature” in order to select
reliable sources of data and insights. As regards the recent history of jihadist
terrorist media, Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo (2007) published a survey
for RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty. The survey lists insurgent groups active in
Iraq, providing essential information on their history, ideology, target, and
media logo and organization; up to 2007, these groups were 1) Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI/Al-Qaeda); 2) Mujahidin Army in Iraq; 3) Islamic Army in Iraq; 4) Ansar
Al-Sunnah Army (previously Ansar Al-Islam); 5) Iraqi Resistance Movement-1920
Revolution Brigades; 6) the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAMI). Tensions,
fights, and fusions among these groups increasingly led to the formation of what
is now known as the Islamic State (IS), which maintains the same logo of the
Islamic State of Iraq. Kimmage and Ridolfo also list virtual and transnational
media agencies that produce and diffuse messages with the logo of IS: 1) Al-Sahab
Institute for Media Production; 2) Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF); 3) Al-Fajr
Media Center; 4) Al-Boraq Media Center; 5) Al-Furqan Institute of Media
Production. Jihadist terrorist propaganda is created and diffused also by indivi-
dual producers and forum contributors, whose identity and development are even
more difficult to trace. Some of them, like the Kuwait-based radical cleric Hamid
al-Ali,9 have attained international status and audience.
The Al-Furqan Institute of Media Production was the first media agency of ISI.
Created in November 2006, soon after the establishment of ISI, it would produce all
its films, audios, and videotaped addresses, as well as the ISI/Al-Qaeda-affiliated
9 Hamid bin Abdallah al-Ali (born 1960).
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periodical Biographies of Notable Martyrs. With the establishment of ISIS (currently
IS), I’tisaam Media Foundation, formed in March 2013, became its main media
outlet; it distributes through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF; see Bilger
2014). GIMF had already manifested interest in reaching a western audience,
for instance by translating addresses by members of Al-Qaeda’s central leadership
(see the French translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s statements); GIMF also produced
a French translation of an Al-Furqan-produced ISI/Al-Qaeda statement on the
Baghdad security plan. In 2014, ISIS established the Al Hayat Media Center,
with the explicit goal of targeting western audiences. It produces materials in
English, German, Russian, and French (see Gertz 2014). In July 2014, IS launched
the digital magazine Dabiq, meant to present the group and its activities in a
multiplicity of languages.
Gambhir (2014) provides a detailed analysis of communicative format, con-
tent, and strategies of this magazine.10 IS usage of social media, and in particular
of Twitter, has attracted widespread attention.11 On apps developed by IS in order
to boost its hashtags on Twitter, see a study by the Anti-Defamation League
published in June 2014 (ADL 2014a).12 On (mostly failed) attempts by social
media companies to block jihadist communication in social media, see
Friedman 2014 and a study by the Anti-Defamation League published in July
2014 (ADL 2014b). Al-Furqan also produced the two videos showing the decapita-
tion of US photojournalist James Foley and US journalist Steven Sotloff. Both
videos featured professional visual editing and attracted worldwide attention and
commentaries, mostly by journalists, but also by scholars (Montani 2014). Other
aspects of IS propaganda have been the object of more circumscribed attention.
Prusher (2014) provides insights on the ISIS logo and flag. Khalaf and Jones (2014)
show how IS media agencies produce professional reports – comprehensive of
statistics and charts – of its brutalities in order to attract funding and recruit
members. On the foundation of the IS agency Ajnad Media Foundation, specialized
in jihadist chants, see the January 15, 2014 report on SITE.
Jihadism online radicalization and recruitment has already been studied in
the US. There is strong evidence, indeed, that Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,
the alleged perpetrators of the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that
killed three people and injured 264 others, radicalized through watching online
the videos of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric killed in a
10 See also the August 1, 2014 analysis published by Michael W. S. Ryan for the Jamestown
Foundation.
11 See Khalaf and Jones (2014) for a sketch of analysis; see also Berger (2014) for a detailed
study.
12 See also Frenkel (2014) and Stone (2014).
Propaganda mala fide 11
Brought to you by | Universita' Studi di Torino
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/24/15 9:05 AM
US drone strike in Yemen in 2011, who encouraged attacks against the West on
behalf of Al Qaeda through dozens of English-language videos, articles, books,
and lectures.13 Anwar al-Awlaki was a regular contributor to Inspire, Al Qaeda’s
first-ever English-language digital magazine, which would provide detailed
bomb-making instructions and call on followers to “destroy” America. In
Inspire, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev found instructions on how to make
the pressure cooker bombs that they planted at the Boston Marathon. In 2013,
Abtalul media group, an Afghanistan-based propaganda agency supporting the
Taliban, started publishing Azan, an online jihadist magazine modeled after
Saudi Arabia-based Inspire magazine (which ended its publication in June
2013). In Autumn 2013, Azan published a seventy-two page issue on “To the
Jihadis in the West.”14
As is evident from this brief survey, information on jihadist western online
propaganda comes from disparate sources and offers different levels of analysis.
A systematic and scholarly study of the phenomenon is sorely missing. Previous
surveys of web jihad, indeed, such as Lohlker (2013), Ramsay (2013), or the 2012
report by the US Congress,15 do not take into account recent developments of the
phenomenon, which took momentum especially in the second half of 2014.
Furthermore, no anthropological, cross-cultural, and trans-historical read-
ing of jihadist propaganda has been attempted thus far.
6 A rapidly changing landscape: Some guidelines
Given the rapidity by which the geopolitics of terrorist jihadism presently
evolves, no semiotic analysis can do without an on-going reappraisal of the
geopolitical situation, media panorama, and scholarly literature concerning
terrorist jihadist web propaganda; indeed, one of the risks of semiotically
analyzing these materials consists in the extremely fast evolution of the
13 On Anwar al-Awlaki biography and profile, see the report by the Anti-Defamation League
published in November 2009 (ADL 2009); on his influence on perpetrators of jihadist attacks in
the US, Nigeria, Canada, and UK, see the (2014) report by the Anti-Defamation League; on
homegrown US jihadism see also the (2007) report by the New York City Police Department
(Silber and Bhatt 2007).
14 For a detailed analysis, see the December 3, (2013) report by the Anti-Defamation League
(ADL 2013).
15 See also Ulph (2005), Burton (2006), Rogan (2006), Roversi (2008), Weimann (2006), Jordán and
Torres Soriano (2007), Bunt (2009), US Congress (2009), Jenkins (2011), Lohlker (2012), Torres
Soriano (2014).
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phenomenon that the analysis is meant to study. Semiotic analysis must be
based on exhaustive knowledge of the state of the art as regards research on
terrorist jihadist online propaganda. Preparation of the present essay focused in
particular on the following sources of information:16 1) scholarly publications
(articles, books, working papers) published about the subject, in English,
French, Italian, German, Spanish, and other languages; 2) open-access investi-
gative reports prepared by police and security agencies in western countries,
with particular attention to the US, Canada, Australia, UK, France, Belgium,
Netherland, Spain, and Italy; 3) white papers published by private research
centers and think-tanks.17
Sources of terrorist jihadist propaganda on the web are multiplying and diver-
sifying; traditionalmedia like journals, magazines, radio, and television are increas-
ingly replaced by new and social media; most of the conversion and radicalization
processes that lead to the recruitment of new jihadist terrorists currently happen
online, through social media like Facebook and Twitter. Semiotic analysismust also
16 They have been classified according to a) source of publication; b) date of publication; c)
geopolitical area(s) they bear upon; d) Jihadist organization(s) they focus on; e) Jihadist media
agencies they consider; f) Jihadist material(s) they analyze.
17 They have been classified according to the following parameters: i) focus of the research center
(in terms of geopolitical area(s), Jihadist group(s), and material(s) investigated); ii) infrastructures
and resources (databases and other archives); iii) specific methodology, with assessment of pros
and cons; iii) added value to research on web terrorist jihadist propaganda; iv) good research
practices. Among research centers on terrorism whose research has been useful for the preparation
of the present essay: 1) International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, http://www.icsr.
info) at King’s College London; 2) Rand Europe, Cambridge (http://www.rand.org/randeurope.
html); 3) The Center on Terrorism at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York (http://
johnjayresearch.org/ct/); 4) The Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid (http://www.realinstitutoelcano.
org); 5) ITSTIME – Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies at the
Catholic University of Milan (http://www.itstime.it); 6) The International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (http://www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/); 7) The
Centre for Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University, Sydney
(http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/department_of_po-
licing_intelligence_and_counter_ terrorism/); 8) The Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and
Political Violence at St. Andrew University (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/); 9) The Center
for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the National Defense College, Stockholm (https://www.fhs.se/en/
research/research-centres-and-programmes/center-for-asymmetric-threat-studies/about/); 10) The
Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies (http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism); 11) International Institute for
Counter-terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Research Center of Herzliya, Israel (http://www.ict.
org.il/); 12) Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, University of Leiden at theHague (http://www.
campusdenhaag.nl/ctc/).
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rely on systematic survey of the media sources of terrorist jihadist propaganda, in
order to a) assess the impact of each media source in the creation and propagation
of jihadist propaganda; and b) evaluate the adoption of new media sources, in
particular those created in the last years; media technology indeed is evolving at
such speed that it is not unlikely that the main media sources of future terrorist
jihadist propaganda are still to be invented and/or tested.
On the basis of comprehensive survey of state-of-the-art and media sources,
guidelines for exhaustive analysis of terrorist jihadist propaganda can be outlined.
For each propaganda message, the analysis must a) reconstruct its historical and
geopolitical context; b) gather data about its diffusion and circulation; c) accu-
mulate materials about its reception in the form of online comments and both
verbal and visual quotations in forums and social media; d) most importantly,
analyze the various messages through generative semiotics, the method of seman-
tic analysis elaborated by Franco-Lithuanian semiotician Algirdas J. Greimas and
his school from the 1960s on (Greimas 1966, 1970, 1975, 1983).
This methodology consists in dissecting and analyzing texts according to
progressive levels of complexity and abstraction, from the general values that
texts communicate to the particular stylistic features of such communication.
In particular, messages must be decoded through generative semiotics in order to
answer the following questions: i) What is the imaginaire to which messages resort
in order to construct their rhetoric? (Leone 2011b) ii) What mythical figures and
topoi of the Islamic tradition are referred to, and with what ideological slant? iii)
What are the deep values evoked by the messages, and in contraposition with what
other values? iv) How do narratives in messages construct the relation between
heroes and anti-heroes, helpers and opponents, positive and negative missions? v)
Most centrally, how does the rhetorical structure of messages, through their verbal,
visual, and audio contents, predispose the cognitive, emotional, and pragmatic
point of view of readers/observers? vi) How is the reader/observer posited as target
of conversion, radicalization, and recruitment? vii) What are the temporal and
spatial coordinates in which messages set their narratives? viii) What is the inter-
pretive and pragmatic response that messages are meant to elicit in their audience?
Generative semiotics has developed specific frameworks of textual analysis in
order to answer the abovementioned questions. In particular, question i) can be
addressed through cultural semiotics, both in its Greimassian version (analysis of
forms of life) and in the version elaborated by Russian semiotician Jurij M. Lotman
and the School of Moscow/Tartu;18 question ii) can be addressed with reference to
18 Lotman’s method consists in tracing the movement of cultural forms in a certain society as
though they were part of a biosphere. (Lotman [1984, 1990; Lotman et al. 1985] calls “semiosphere”
the virtual space in which cultural forms circulate in a society.)
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the Greimassian model (in particular, the analysis of “mythical discourse, as well as
the analysis of religious discourse developed by the Groupe d’Entrevernes and
other scholars who applied generative semiotics to religious discourse)19 and to
the US school of semiotic anthropology (which particularly insists on the concept
of “semiotic ideology”)20; question iii) can be addressed with reference to the
analysis of axiologies developed by Greimas and his school;21 question iv) can be
addressed in the framework of Greimas’s “narrative grammar,” which models
the main elements and dynamics of narrative patterns; question v) can be
addressed with reference to Greimas’s theory of enunciation, as well as in relation
to Umberto Eco’s model of “interpretive semiotics” (Eco 1979); question vi) can be
addressed in relation to visual semiotics and its theory of enunciation, as well as
with reference to the semiotic analysis of religious conversion (Leone 2014a);
question vii) can be addressed in the framework of Greimas’s analysis of
discourse, as well as with reference to Émile Benveniste’s (1966, 1971) theory of
enunciation; question viii) can be addressed by the whole of semiotic strategies put
forward above.
The analysis must compare and contrast results obtained by applying a
common methodology on the various messages. Propaganda materials taken
into consideration must include digital magazines, videos, web forums,
chants, gadgets, and other items of jihadist merchandising available for sale
on the web, social media, apps, videogames, and also new media or social
media. Given this abundance of materials, comprehensive analysis must resort
to two further analytical strategies: a) sampling of materials according to the
principle of non-redundancy: redundant materials are archived, but only
new communicative or persuasive features become object of classification; at
the same time, statistic occurrence of communicative features is accounted for;
b) tailoring of the general methodology to the specific media and genres;
generative semiotics is a method of semantic analysis that can be applied to
any message; however, specificity of medium, genre, and format must be taken
into account, especially as regards the new ways of circulation of meaning in
social media.
Themultidisciplinary approach described thus far must aim at systematic survey
of literature and assessment of the state of the art; succinct description of geopolitical
and sociocultural contexts of terrorist jihadist propaganda; classification of its media
19 For a survey, Leone (forthcoming).
20 For a survey, Leone (2010a).
21 The so-called “semiotic square,” a visual diagram used to articulate semantic structures in
texts.
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sources, with indication of their actual and potential impact; typology of messages,
with in-depth analysis of their (verbal, visual, and audio) grammar, semantic
patterns, and pragmatic efficacy; sampled messages must be dissected along the
layers of analysis set by the essay methodology so as to single out lines of evolution
and tendencies in terrorist jihadist propaganda.
7 An experimental reading
The most experimental and riskiest stage of analysis must consist in a cross-
cultural, trans-historical, and comparative reading of violent religious propa-
ganda materials: how can their communicative patterns and persuasive
strategies be compared and contrasted with those of similar materials pro-
duced in other historical and confessional contexts, for instance, with medie-
val sermons and paintings inciting enrolment in crusades or with early modern
appeals to missionary martyrdom? On the opposite, what are the specific
features of these messages, and the impact of new communication technology
on their efficacy?
Terrorist jihadism emerges from a complex geopolitical and sociocultural
context, as well as from a multiplicity of causes. Online propaganda stimulates
the conversion, radicalization, and recruitment of jihadist terrorists, but no
direct link can be determined between the creation and circulation of online
propaganda and the recruitment of new jihadists. Yet, although jihadist propa-
ganda does not play a determinant role in recruitment, it definitely plays an
extremely significant role in it. National and international security agencies have
two options: a) seeking to block this propaganda, for instance, by trying to
control media sources such as social media; b) seeking to understand, and
possibly to deconstruct, violent religious propaganda. The first option might
be effective, but entails several risks, such as i) potentially reducing the freedom
of communication in society; ii) eliminating an important source of information
and control by security agencies;22 iii) facilitating the self-victimization of
jihadist groups and their self-representation as communication mavericks and
underdogs (Kamolnick 2014). In-depth cross-cultural and trans-historical knowl-
edge of violent religious propaganda can be used so to circumscribe the key
persuasive drivers of web jihadist communication. Invocation of the authority of
22 Strategically, it is better to control a jihadist web forum than to abolish it, forcing jihadist
communication to re-emerge through another medium or platform, unknown to security
agencies.
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a supposedly sacred text, construction of the religious community as victim of
sacrilegious oppression, evocation of scenarios of revenge and redemption
through subjugation of the enemy, etc.: terrorist jihadist online propaganda
shares these narrative topoi with other instances of violent confessional persua-
sion; yet, new technology of communication gives novel force to the rhetoric of
jihadists. The ultimate goal of semiotic analysis must be coming up with an
interpretive framework able to capture the intertwining of such lines of persis-
tence and novelty.
There is no predetermined methodology for the cross-cultural and trans-
historical reading of violent religious propaganda. Aby Warburg and his inter-
preters provide interesting insights on the persistence of emotional formulae
(Pathosformeln) across ages and cultures (Leone 2014b).23 A representational
atlas of the topoi of violent confessional persuasion across epochs and faiths
is, indeed, what this last, most experimental section is about.24
8 Conclusion: Toward an interdisciplinary
understanding
An example of case study will elucidate the methodological approach described
thus far. The tragic videos of the beheadings of IS hostages, produced and
diffused by IS media agency Al-Furqan, have widely circulated through all
visual media and ignited abhorred indignation in the West. At the same time,
the same videos have been received with elation and pride by IS sympathizers
around the world, and even triggered episodes of media contagion and simula-
tion. Such radical disparity of responses, denoting a dramatic severance of the
global audience, should itself be object of interdisciplinary investigation. Recent
research on empathy in cognitive neurosciences indicates that motor, somato-
sensory, and viscero-motor representations of these videos should lead most
viewers to empathize with the victims even at a sub-cognitive level;25 yet, two
puzzling phenomena arise in the reception of these videos: on the one hand, a
23 For an introduction, See Cieri Via (2011); on Warburg and moving images, Michaud (1998);
and Warburg and neurosciences, Gallese (2012).
24 Cf. Flach et al. (2005).
25 Freedberg and Gallese (2007) and Gallese and Guerra (2013). Also see recent research on the
response of mirror neurons to the representation of cuts in images (Gallese 2014). On moving
images and embodied empathy, see also D’Aloia (2013).
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sort of cognitive shock, or saturation effect, prevents the western audience from
fully identifying with victims (Montani 2014); on the other hand, sympathizers of
IS are induced by propaganda to actually empathize with killers, despite the fact
that their faces are veiled, whereas the faces of victims, and their physiognomic
expressions26 are clearly visible. Should one conclude that terrorist jihadist
propaganda leads to a dramatic resetting of even the most basic mechanisms
of cognitive, emotional, and somatic reactions? To a sort of in-depth cognitive
reprogramming? The only way to gauge the persuasive efficacy of terrorist
jihadist propaganda is to analyze it in an interdisciplinary framework, as
instance of a more general category of “violent religious propaganda.”
On the one hand, these videos must be analyzed in their specificity, through
placing them in relation with precise spatial, temporal, and cultural coordinates.
Hence, the historian of religion will comment on the history of sacrifice in Islam,
and the resort to beheading as demonstrative capital punishment (Finn 2012;
Pelizzari and Sylla 2014), while the anthropologist of religion will investigate the
symbolical results of retrieving this ritual framework, meant at divesting
victims of their humanity and connoting them as sacrificial animals. At the
same time, the anthropologist of religion will also reflect on the meaning of
re-appropriating such ritual frame by killers who turn out to be western citizens
with a second- or third-generation migration background.
However, understanding the persuasive potential of these videos will mean
also dissecting them from a technical point of view. The expert in media studies
must therefore analyze video shots, with their specific angles, transitions, and
cuts; quality of resolution; color, sound, visual editing and special effects; as
well as the other codes that compose the communicative patterns of these videos
(Donghi 2012). The same media scholar, moreover, must suggest intertextual
relations between the media imaginaire evoked by IS videos and that which
characterizes the “media diet” of young western citizens, especially in migrant
communities. How do these videos adopt typically western visual and sound
formats in order to convey radically anti-western values? Furthermore, what is
the pragmatic impact of social media in the diffusion and reception of these
materials? Is the exponential replication of these messages in social networks
creating a sort of “atmospheric propaganda” (see Hansen 2006) that immerses
viewers in a kind of “virtual orality”?
The expert of rhetoric, in his/her turn, contributes to answering these questions
through in-depth analysis of the videos’ verbal and visual communication patterns,
26 According to abundant literature, one of the main sources of inter-personal empathy, see
Brilliant (2000, 2007); see also Gombrich (1982).
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starting from what the killer says when addresses his audience. What kind of
subject is posited by this discourse, and what sort of addressee? What rhetorical
topoi and figures are adopted in order to terrify, intimidate, and threaten, but also in
order to entice potential sympathizers? How is this rhetorical strategy conveyed by
gestures and other non-verbal codes, such as the tone and modulation of the voice,
the accent, the setting, etc.? Security studies must help in contextualizing the
persuasive force of these videos by providing information on their production,
circulation, and potential diffusion. In what conditions was it possible to make
these videos, and how can they circulate without obstacles throughout the global
network?What measures can be taken to block or at least to trace their labyrinthine
paths throughout the web? From this point of view, image and international law
must offer precious insights on legal limits and possibilities that such materials
encounter in their international meandering. How does governmental action
against terrorist jihadist propaganda affect freedom of communication in the var-
ious legal contexts?
On the other hand, the persuasive efficacy of these videos can be gauged not
only through contextualization with reference to their specific coordinates,
but also through comparison and contrast with other historical, sociocultural,
and confessional contexts. Indeed, cross-culturally and trans-historically,
“displaying an enemy’s head is one of the most widely distributed signs of
victory” (Janes 1991). How do IS videos compare with heads that seventh-century
BC Ashurbanipal’s Assyrians sculpted in piles on the palace walls? Or to those
that eighteenth-century AD Afghan warriors fixed to their tents? Or to those that
one finds in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Japanese epic Heike monogatari
(Spierenburg 1984)? And what about the beheadings that marked the French
Revolution (Arasse 1987),27 or the recent well-known beheadings in Burma (in
September 1988)? What are the semiotic and anthropological commonalities
among these tragic uses of the enemy’s bodies to build the discourse of propa-
ganda (Gopnik 2014)? And, on the opposite, what historical, political, and
religious specificities characterize IS tragic videos?
Only the joint effort of an inter-disciplinary approach is able to answer
these questions and contribute an in-depth understanding of violent religious
propaganda beyond what is available in grey literature. Semiotic competences
are urgently required not only to give fresh answers to the anxious social
demand of knowledge concerning the phenomenon of terrorist jihadism and
its web propaganda, but also and foremost for the advancement of fundamental
research about the nature of violent confessional persuasion.
27 Including those of statues, see Dupeux et al. (2001). Cf. Dectot (2007), Weyl Carr (2007),
Varner (2004, 2005).
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